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In this article, I argue against a federal constitutional amendment
preventing states from recognizing same-sex marriages. As of now, a na-
tionwide policy debate is underway on the merits of providing full marital
recognition to gay couples. That debate is still in its infancy and is proceed-
ing in a variety of ways, with divergent policy choices in the states. It
should not be cut short by the extraordinary mechanism of a constitutional
amendment that would substantially delay or permanently foreclose what
may turn out to be a valuable social reform.
Pointing to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health extending marriage to same-sex
couples in that state,' and to the actions of various local officials around the
country recognizing gay marriages, 2 proponents of the Federal Marriage
Amendment ("FMA") claim that an amendment is needed immediately to
prevent same-sex marriages from being forced on the nation. Since there is
little likelihood that will happen anytime soon, this argument for an amend-
ment fails. Additionally, they argue that whatever role the courts may play,
a single national policy on the matter is necessary to prevent the confusion
and disruption that would attend disparate state outcomes on the matter.
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. Yale College, 1989; J.D.
University of Chicago, 1992. This article is based on a white paper originally published by the
Cato Institute. I want to thank Ryan Scott for valuable research assistance and comments. I also
want to thank Guy Charles, Michael Gerhardt, Mae Kuykendall, and David McGowan for their
comments.
1. Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
2. David Austin & Laura Gunderson, Ties that Bind & Divide: Multnomah County Recog-
nizes Gay Marriage Amid Joy, Protest, The Oregonian AOl (Mar. 4, 2004) (describing Multno-
mah County, Oregon Chairwoman Diane Linn's decision to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples); Joshua Akers, AG Says 68 Licenses Are Illegal, Albuquerque J. Al (Feb. 21, 2004)
(describing Sandoval County, New Mexico Clerk Victoria Dunlap's decision to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples); Rachel Gordon, S.F. Defies Law, Marries Gays, S.F. Chron. Al
(Feb. 13, 2004) (describing San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's decision to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples).
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Since the legal complications arising from having different states recogniz-
ing different relationships as marriages would be no greater than they have
been throughout our history, during which divergent state family policies
have been the norm, this argument also fails. The policy debate between
the contending sides should continue without one side deploying the trump
card of an amendment.
This paper does not make an argument for same-sex marriage on pol-
icy grounds.3 The argument here is directed entirely to whether a constitu-
tional amendment should dispose of the matter. Whether states should
recognize same-sex marriages as a matter of internal family policy is one
question. Whether they should be permitted to recognize same-sex mar-
riages is a separate question. A person who opposes same-sex marriage on
policy grounds can and should also oppose a constitutional amendment
foreclosing it.4 An opponent of gay marriage may oppose a constitutional
amendment because: (1) he believes that federalism-the traditional, decen-
tralized structure of American government-is the best answer to most dis-
putes about public policy; and/or (2) he is confident that his opposition will
prevail without the need for a constitutional amendment; and/or (3) al-
though he opposes gay marriage now, he is open to subsequent persuasion
by arguments and evidence against his current view, and wants public pol-
icy to remain flexible enough to adjust over time. Not every policy position
one holds must be imposed forevermore on the whole nation by constitu-
tionalizing it. For the same reasons, one who is unsure how he feels about
same-sex marriage can and should oppose a constitutional amendment fore-
closing it.
To summarize the four main points I will make here: First, a constitu-
tional amendment is unnecessary because federal and state laws, combined
with the present state of the relevant constitutional doctrines, already make
court-ordered, nationwide same-sex marriage unlikely for the foreseeable
future. Therefore, an amendment banning same-sex marriage is a solution
in search of a problem. Second, a constitutional amendment defining mar-
riage would be a radical intrusion on the nation's founding commitment to
federalism in an area traditionally reserved for state regulation, family law.
There has been no showing that federalism has been unworkable in the area
of family law. Third, a constitutional amendment banning same-sex mar-
riage would be an unprecedented form of constitutional amendment, cutting
short an ongoing national debate over what privileges and benefits, if any,
ought to be conferred on same-sex couples, and preventing democratic
processes from expanding individual rights. Fourth, the amendment as pro-
posed is constitutional overkill that reaches well beyond the stated concerns
3. I should acknowledge here that I support same-sex marriage as a policy matter.
4. Many conservatives who oppose same-sex marriage also oppose a constitutional amend-
ment banning it. Infra nn. 69-72 and accompanying text.
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of its proponents, foreclosing not just courts but also state legislatures from
recognizing same-sex marriages and perhaps other forms of legal support
for same-sex relationships. Whatever one thinks of same-sex marriage as a
matter of policy, no person who cares about our Constitution and public
policy should support this unnecessary, radical, unprecedented, and overly
broad departure from the nation's traditions and history.
I. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
The FMA would, at a minimum, forbid states to recognize same-sex
marriages. Two different versions of the amendment have been introduced
in Congress. In the House of Representatives, Rep. Marilyn Musgrave (R-
Colo.) has introduced H.R. Jt. Res. 56 ("Musgrave version"), which would
amend the Constitution as follows:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or [sic] the constitu-
tion of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to
require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be con-
ferred upon unmarried couples or groups.5
The Musgrave version of the FMA currently has 127 co-sponsors in
the House. In the Senate, Sen. Wayne Allard (R-Colo.) has introduced
somewhat different language as Sen. Jt. Res. 40 ("Allard version"), which
would amend the Constitution as follows:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution
of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.6
The Allard version of the FMA currently has sixteen co-sponsors in the
Senate.
The first sentence of the Allard version of the FMA is identical to the
first sentence of the Musgrave version. The second sentences are similar,
but differ in three substantive respects. First, the Allard version drops the
Musgrave version's reference to "state or federal law." Second, the Allard
version replaces the Musgrave version's reference to "marital status" with
"marriage." Third, the Allard version replaces the Musgrave version's refer-
ence to "unmarried couples or groups" with "any union other than the union
of a man and a woman." Though in some respects the Allard version ap-
pears narrower than the Musgrave version, its practical effect may be nearly
as sweeping.7
5. H.R. Jt. Res. 56, 108th Cong., § I (May 21, 2003) (as introduced).
6. Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 108th Cong., § 2 (July 7, 2004) (as introduced).
7. lnfra pt. V.
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On July 15, 2004, the Senate rejected an attempt to invoke cloture-
cut off debate-to proceed with consideration of the Allard version of the
FMA. The vote was 48 in favor of cloture and 50 opposed.8 Under Senate
rules, cloture would have required 60 votes. The FMA likewise fell short in
the House of Representatives on September 30, 2004, with 227 members in
favor, 186 against, and 20 not voting.9 Ratification of an amendment under
the usual procedure would require a 2/3 vote in the Senate and the House,
followed by approval from 3/4 of the states."°
II. A FEDERAL AMENDMENT IS UNNECESSARY
A constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage is unneces-
sary, even if one opposes same-sex marriage as a matter of policy.
A. The Alleged "Threat" from Courts and Local Officials
Advocates of an amendment claim it is needed to prevent activist state
and federal courts, at the request of gay-rights advocates, from imposing
same-sex marriage on the country. For example, the Senate Republican Pol-
icy Committee, in a policy position paper entitled "The Threat to Marriage
From the Courts," used this fear to urge the Senate's consideration of an
amendment. "Activist lawyers and their allies in the legal academy have
devised a strategy to override public opinion and force same-sex marriage
on society through pliant, activist courts," warned the policy committee in
the summer of 2003."
President George W. Bush used the specter of judicial activism and
lawlessness by local officials to justify his support of a federal amendment.
In the aftermath of the Massachusetts high court decision and the sporadic
actions of local officials, including San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom,
recognizing gay marriages, Bush announced his support for a constitutional
amendment. "After more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, and
millennia of human experience, a few judges and local authorities are
presuming to change the most fundamental institution of civilization," Bush
8. The two senators who missed the cloture vote, John Kerry (D-Mass.) and John Edwards
(D-N.C.), have stated that they oppose a federal amendment banning gay marriages. See e.g. Gebe
Martinez, Gay Marriage Ban Defeated in Senate: Vote Shows Rift in GOP; Supporters Vow to Try
Again, Houston Chron. 1 (July 15, 2004). Additionally, a few Republican senators who voted for
cloture have indicated opposition to, or serious doubts about the need for, a constitutional amend-
ment. Among these are Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Penn.). See Steve Goldstein, Will Defeat on Gay
Marriage Ban Hurt Santorum?, Philadelphia Inquirer Al (July 15, 2004).
9. Anne C. Mulkern, Gay-Marriage Amendment Fails to Win 2/3 House Vote Author Still
Claims Victory; Opponents Cite Racist Parallel, Denver Post A2 (Oct. 1, 2004).
10. U.S. Const. art. V.
11. Senate Republican Policy Committee, Massachusetts Court Expected to Legalize Same-
Sex Marriage: The Threat to Marriage from the Courts 1 (July 29, 2003) (available at http:t/rpc.
senate.gov/_files/CIVILsdO9O4O3.pdf) (accessed Mar. 4, 2005).
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said on February 24, 2004. 12 "If we're to prevent the meaning of marriage
from being changed forever, our nation must enact a constitutional amend-
ment to protect marriage in America."' 3 Bush also warned of unspecified
"serious consequences throughout the country" if a city or state recognized
gay marriages even in its own jurisdiction.1
4
Thus, argue proponents of an amendment, the matter will be decided at
the national level whether we enact an amendment or not. They claim that
either activist courts and local officials will foist same-sex marriage upon
an unwilling nation or the people will "protect" marriage by enacting a
constitutional amendment establishing the definition of marriage as the
union of one man and one woman.
The "threat" from courts is more imagined than real. While there is no
evidence of a uniform litigation strategy by gay advocates-and indeed
some dismay among gay-marriage advocates at the filing of inopportune
lawsuits in places like Florida-there has been significant litigation on the
issue in the past decade. 5 Filing lawsuits and winning lawsuits are not the
same thing, however. Anyone with a printer and enough money for a filing
fee can file a lawsuit, of course, and gay-marriage advocates are likely to
continue to do so. But winning is a very different matter. At the state level,
while gay-marriage advocates may win some battles in state court litigation,
they will lose many others.
In any event, as we shall see,16 state-court activism and disregard of
state definitions of marriage by local officials are phenomena the states are
equipped to handle without federal interference. Even where a state court
orders same-sex marriage in its jurisdiction, that should be a matter for a
state to resolve internally, through its own governmental processes, as the
states have so far done. There is no particular reason to believe New
Yorkers will think of judicial "activism" the same way as Iowans do. At the
federal level, as we shall see,' 7 given the present state of the relevant consti-
tutional doctrines, courts are unlikely to impose gay marriage on the entire
nation for at least the foreseeable future.
Forty-one states have declared same-sex marriages contrary to their
own public policy, barring recognition of same-sex marriages under state
12. Edwin Chen, Bush Urges Same-Sex Marriage Ban, L.A. Times Al (Feb. 25, 2004).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Most recently, a lawsuit seeking the recognition of same-sex marriages in Connecticut
was filed by the same group, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, that sponsored the Good-
ridge litigation in Massachusetts. P1. Verified Comp. at 22, Kerrigan v. Conn. Dept. Pub. Health,
(Conn. Super. New Haven Jud. Dist. Aug. 25, 2004) (available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/
Kerrigan-Mock-complaint.pdf) (accessed Mar. 4, 2004). At the same time, legislators in Connect-
icut appear poised to grant some form of recognition, rights, and responsibilities to gay couples in
2005. Fred Lucas, Same-Sex Civil Union Bill Likely: State Legislators Support Expanding Gay
Rights, Danbury News Times (Conn.) (Nov. 14, 2004).
16. Infra pt. II(B).
17. Infra pt. 11(C).
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statutes or state constitutions.18 The 1996 Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") bars recognition of such marriages for federal purposes.19 It is
unlikely courts will impose immediate, nationwide gay marriage contrary to
this powerfully expressed legislative and popular will. No court has yet
done so.
For the most part state courts can be expected to continue to reject
same-sex marriage claims. Neither federal nor state courts are likely to
order same-sex marriage under the traditional interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's Full Faith and Credit Clause. Nor, for the foreseeable future, are
courts likely to mandate same-sex marriage under substantive federal con-
stitutional doctrines, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. This paper will now address each of
the above points in greater detail.2°
B. Substantive State Constitutional Law, the Role of Local Officials,
and the National Effect of Individual State Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriages
Going back to the early 1970s, in cases challenging state marriage
laws under substantive doctrines of state constitutions, such as state consti-
tutional equal-rights provisions, most state courts have rejected arguments
for same-sex marriage.2 While gay-marriage advocates succeeded in the
Massachusetts litigation, their success has been mixed in other recent mar-
riage cases in state courts around the country.22 Though it is still early, no
other state high court has yet followed the Massachusetts lead.
The strong resistance of state courts to same-sex marriage should not
be surprising since 87 percent of all state court judges are subject to some
form of election.23 Thus, state courts are accountable to a public that in
most jurisdictions still opposes same-sex marriage by fairly large margins.
Public opposition was strongly reinforced in 2004 by the passage of state
18. For a good summary of states' laws relating to the recognition of gay marriages, includ-
ing those that have passed "little DOMA" laws and have passed or are considering state constitu-
tional amendments, see Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, http://www.
stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showStorylnfo&id=353058 (Nov. 3, 2004).
19. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002)).
20. I will not address here my personal view of the merits of the legal arguments for same-
sex marriage, but only the likelihood that such arguments will be persuasive to courts of final
resort in the near future.
21. See e.g. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. App. Div. 1974).
22. Gay-marriage advocates have lost in New Jersey, Lewis v. Harris, ___A.2d_, 2003
WL 23191114, at *28 (N.J. Super. L. Div. Nov. 5, 2003), and in Arizona, Standhart v. Ariz. Sup.
Ct. ex rel., County of Mancopa, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. App. Div. 2003), and won in Washing-
ton, Andersen v. King County, P.3d , 2004 WL 1738447 at * 11 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4,
2004) and California, In re Marriage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4365
(Super. Ct. S.F. County, Cal., Mar. 14, 2005) (available at: http://www.sftc.org/Docs/
Marriage.pdf). Each of these decisions will likely be considered by higher courts in these states.
23. Senate Republican Policy Committee, supra n. 11, at 9, n. 38.
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constitutional amendments banning gay marriage in 13 states, by wide mar-
gins.24 This public resistance will likely make most state courts even more
reluctant than federal courts to order the recognition of same-sex marriages.
Already, in response to the political backlash, gay-marriage advocates are
planning to scale back their challenges to state marriage laws.
25
On the three occasions prior to Goodridge that state courts have moved
to order the recognition of same-sex marriage in their states under their own
substantive state constitutional doctrines-in Alaska, Hawaii, and Ver-
mont-the democratic processes in those states immediately dealt with the
issue by preventing the imposition of full-fledged gay marriage. In Hawaii,
for example, the state legislature and the people themselves voted to amend
their own constitution to permit the state legislature to define marriage. 26 In
Vermont, the state legislature created a system of civil unions that extends
the benefits and responsibilities of marriage-under state law only-to
same-sex couples, but reserves marriage itself for opposite-sex couples.
27
Historically, the states themselves have been entrusted to rein in the
activism of their state courts. The states certainly have the power to do so,
whether or not they choose to use it. In Massachusetts, the state legislature
has begun the state constitutional amendment process to reverse Good-
ridge. 8 There is no reason to believe that the citizens of Massachusetts are
incapable of dealing with their own courts if they choose to do so. As noted
above, voters in 13 states in 2004 alone amended their state constitutions to
ban gay marriages. Doubtless more states will do so in the years to come.
The states have not previously asked for, or received, the assistance of fed-
eral authorities to deal with their own state courts, state statutes, or state
constitutions.
24. The margins in 2004 ranged from 57%-43% in relatively liberal Oregon to 86%-14% in
socially conservative Mississippi. The other states to pass state amendments banning gay mar-
riage in 2004 were Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. The Associated Press, Voters Pass All 11 Bans on Gay Mar-
riage, MSNBC News, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353/ (accessed Mar. 29, 2005). Gay-
marriage advocates may now file state constitutional challenges to some of these amendments for
procedural reasons, for example, because they violate some state constitutional requirements that
amendments not be misleading or impermissibly involve more than one "object or purpose." Ar-
thur S. Leonard, New State Amendments Vulnerable: Legal Challenges, Though, Must Negotiate
Polarized Political, Judicial Landscape, Gay City News (Nov. 4, 2004) (available at http://www.
gaycitynews.com/gcn_345/newstateamendments.html) (accessed Mar. 4, 2005). Even if such pro-
cedural challenges succeed, they will at best delay passage of such amendments since proponents
could always propose amendments that comply with any procedural requirements.
25. Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. Times A16 (Nov. 12, 2004)
(quoting Matt Foreman, executive director of the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, as saying:
"Our legal strategy is at least ten years ahead of our political and legislative strategy.").
26. Haw. Const. art. I, § 23.
27. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, Vt. Pub. Act 91 (Apr. 26, 2000) (codified at Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1202-07 (Supp. 2001)).
28. Frank Phillips & Raphael Lewis, Amendment Would Turn Gay Marriages into Civil Un-
ions: Lawmakers Get Proposal Today, Boston Globe AI (Feb. 11, 2004).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
It is true that some state constitutional amendment procedures, as in
Massachusetts, are time-consuming and cumbersome. This makes it possi-
ble that, in the interim between a state court decision ordering the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages and a state constitutional amendment reversing
that decision, same-sex marriages will be recognized in an individual state.
Yet this lag between judicial action and democratic response is familiar in
all states where state constitutional amendment procedures are time-con-
suming and cumbersome. These states, too, have always been trusted to
handle their own courts and constitutions. There is no reason to believe, and
thus far, no evidence from Massachusetts to suggest, that the temporary
recognition of same-sex marriages in a state presents such a special and
immediate danger to the nation that it can only be handled by a federal
constitutional amendment.29
Even where a state supreme court orders the recognition of full-
fledged, same-sex marriage in a state, the ruling is limited in its reach to the
state itself. A state court ruling favoring same-sex marriage could not re-
quire other states to recognize such marriages. That would require addi-
tional hypothetical rulings by courts-of-last-resort in the other states
requiring their own jurisdictions to recognize such marriages. A pro-gay-
marriage ruling in a state court, as in Massachusetts, would likely be based
on the state, not federal, constitution. The immediate legal effect of the
decision would be confined to the state itself.
Could a pro-gay-marriage ruling in a state affect the outcomes of such
challenges in other states by influencing other states' substantive interpreta-
tions of their own constitutions?3" Certainly such a ruling would not bind
other states' interpretation of their own state constitutions. Though courts in
sister states might regard the pro-gay-marriage ruling as persuasive author-
ity in the interpretation of their own state constitutions, they would also
have a larger body of contrary authority from other states to follow. The
lone state, or few states, to recognize same-sex marriages will hold the mi-
nority view for a very long time. As noted above, judges in most state
courts are both accountable to the state's voters and are reversible by demo-
cratic processes. Both of these factors will likely make them reluctant, as
they historically have been, to impose gay marriage even in their
jurisdictions.
The threat of "lawlessness" from local officials is even more remote.
In each of the few locales where same-sex marriages were performed in
February and March 2004, those marriages have been halted by the officials
themselves, by higher state officials, or by state courts. While more than
4,000 same-sex marriages were performed in San Francisco last February,
29. This is especially true because sister states are unlikely to be required to recognize these
out-of-state same-sex marriages. See infra pt. II(C)I.
30. This is another fear cited by the Senate Republican Policy Committee. Supra n. 11, at 2.
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for example, the California Supreme Court subsequently nullified them,
holding that the mayor did not have the power to order marriage licenses
issued to gay couples in defiance of state law. 3' A state court also put a stop
to the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples by officials in
Multnomah County, Oregon." After the brief flurry of actions by local offi-
cials recognizing gay marriages in early 2004, they have now stopped.
Even if and when individual states recognize same-sex marriages,
while other states refuse to recognize them, there is no reason to believe
these discordant approaches will create insurmountable legal or public pol-
icy problems. There is no uniform national family law, just as there is no
uniform national property law or criminal code. Throughout the nation's
history, states have adopted their own family law policies, including their
own requirements for marriage. These divergent policies have not created
intolerable levels of confusion or conflict among the states.
There is no reason to believe that the difficulties that may occasionally
arise from diverse state policies on same-sex marriage will be any more
intractable for state courts and other officials than they have been for other
diverse family and marriage law policies. The existence of same-sex mar-
riages will call for courts in sister states to respect the particular judgments
of other state courts, as in child-custody and property disputes between
same-sex partners who divorce. But that does not mean that same-sex mar-
riage will spread from state to state; it merely ensures legal regularity and
predictability with respect to particular disputes between spouses. While
respecting the power of the states to determine their own policies on matters
as fundamental as property, criminal, and family law means there is a lack
of uniformity in these areas, the corresponding benefits of state experimen-
tation and local control have always been regarded as overwhelmingly com-
pensating advantages of our federal system. 3
C. Federal Constitutional Doctrines
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
Supporters of the FMA argue that if a state court imposes same-sex
marriage on a state, then courts in other states or federal courts might re-
quire states in their jurisdiction to recognize such marriages under the Con-
stitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause ("FFCC"), article IV, section L"3
This fear is hypothetical and exaggerated. As a nation, we have already
addressed this issue. In 1996, in reaction to litigation for same-sex marriage
in Hawaii, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, DOMA. DOMA
defines marriage as the union of one man and one woman for purposes of
31. Lockyer v..City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
32. Li v. State, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004) (unpublished).
33. See infra pt. 1m.
34. Senate Republican Policy Committee, supra n. 11, at 6-7.
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federal law, such as entitlement to Social Security benefits and for federal
taxation.35 DOMA also provides that states may refuse to recognize same-
sex marriages performed elsewhere. 6 A state court decision recognizing
same-sex marriages in a given state does not by itself make DOMA invalid.
No federal or state court has held DOMA unconstitutional; so far, in the
aftermath of Goodridge, the first federal court to examine the matter has
upheld DOMA.37
Let's examine the particulars of the FFCC fear. Supporters of a consti-
tutional amendment warn that Adam and Steve, or Sue and Ellen, will go to
a state that has just recognized same-sex marriages (like Massachusetts), get
married there, and then return to their home state demanding recognition of
their union under the FFCC. Alternatively, a gay couple married in Massa-
chusetts might move and demand that their new home state recognize their
marriage. By this method, they conjecture, gay marriage would gradually
sweep the nation.
However, the FFCC has never been interpreted to mean that every
state must recognize every marriage performed in every other state.38 It is
true that, under the place-of-celebration rule, states usually recognize mar-
riages validly performed in other states. But each state also reserves the
right to refuse to recognize a marriage performed in another state-or per-
formed in a foreign country, like Canada-if that marriage would violate
the state's public policy.39 Under this general rule of recognition, states will
generally overlook small or technical differences in the marriage laws of
other states. For example, the fact that a marriage was witnessed by only
two people-as required in a sister state-instead of three-as required in
the home state-would not usually prevent recognition of a marriage val-
idly performed in the sister state.
But under the public policy exception, states do not ordinarily over-
look major differences in the marriage laws of foreign jurisdictions. For
example, under longstanding principles, states are not required to recognize
a marriage they deem incestuous, even if that marriage was valid in the
state where it was performed.4 ° The Supreme Court has never suggested
that this practice is invalid under the FFCC.
35. See I U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
37. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
38. David P. Currie, Full Faith & Credit to Marriages, 1 Green Bag 2d 7, 8 (1997).
39. Id. at 9-10.
40. See e.g. Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577 (Ala. 1938) (marriage between nephew and
widow of uncle); Petition of Lieberman, 50 F. Supp. 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (marriage between
niece and uncle).
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Forty-one states have already declared by statute and/or state constitu-
tion that it is their public policy not to recognize same-sex marriages.4
Even in the other nine states, state policy may be adequately declared on the
issue to allow those states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages. In that
sense, DOMA and the forty-one "little DOMAs" passed by the states are
probably redundant, a form of added insurance against the recognition of
same-sex marriage by activist judges. Even former Republican congress-
man Bob Barr, who opposes same-sex marriage on policy grounds and was
the main author of DOMA, has argued that DOMA is more than adequate
to prevent the imposition of nationwide same-sex marriage.42
Under the traditional understanding of the FFCC and choice-of-law
principles, then, it is doubtful state or federal courts would require states to
fully recognize same-sex marriages performed elsewhere.43 This does not
mean, of course, that litigants might not be able to find a state or federal
court judge willing to do so. But it does mean that the chances of having
such a ruling withstand appellate review are slim.
2. Substantive Federal Constitutional Doctrines
It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court or the federal appellate
courts, for the foreseeable future, would declare a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage under present understandings of substantive doctrines
arising from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause. No federal or state appellate court, to date, has declared
such a right under any substantive federal constitutional doctrine. Thus,
once again, we are dealing with a purely hypothetical fear of a possible
future ruling by a court of last resort.
a. The Due Process Clause
Lawrence v. Texas,' the recent Supreme Court decision using the Due
Process Clause to strike down Texas's law criminalizing homosexual sex,
has somehow been transformed by the popular press and by FMA support-
ers into a gay-marriage decision. It is not that. In Lawrence, the Court em-
phasized that the Texas law violated the right to liberty insofar as it intruded
41. In Virginia, a state judge recently held that not even same-sex civil unions from Vermont
will be recognized by the state. S. Mitra Kalita, Vt. Same-Sex Unions Null in Va., Judge Says;
Case Seen as Test of Parental Rights, Wash. Post B1 (Aug. 25, 2004).
42. Bob Barr, Leave Marriage to the States, Wash. Post A23 (Aug. 21, 2003).
43. It is always possible courts will abandon this long-held view of the FFCC and choice-of-
law principles. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965 (1997) (arguing that states do not have the right to
refuse to recognize valid marriages performed in other states). Anything is possible. Yet the tradi-
tional view is so entrenched, and the revisionist argument so completely unsupported by prece-
dent, that abandonment is very unlikely.
44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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on private sexual relations between adults in the home.45 The interest in-
volved was the liberty to avoid state intrusion into the bedroom via criminal
law. It did not involve the liberty to seek official state recognition of the
sexual relation, along with all the benefits state recognition entails.4 6 Law-
rence involved the most private of acts-sexual conduct-in the most pri-
vate of places-the home; by contrast, marriage is a public institution
freighted with public meaning and significance. So far, lower federal courts
have adopted a very narrow reading of Lawrence.
4 7
The Court in Lawrence noted explicitly that it was not dealing with a
claim for formal state recognition.4 8 Especially in light of Justice Scalia's
fretting that same-sex marriage may soon be the child of Lawrence,4 9 these
qualifications signal a Court that seems very unlikely even to address the
issue in the near future, much less to take the bold step of ordering nation-
wide same-sex marriage.
A separate argument could be made that same-sex marriage is pro-
tected by the fundamental right to marry also protected by the Due Process
Clause." Since no federal court has yet accepted an argument that the fun-
damental right to marry extends to gay couples, the possibility of a future
ruling on this basis is purely hypothetical and in any event unlikely for the
prudential reasons discussed below."'
b. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause hardly seems more promising in the near
term for gay-marriage advocates. The only justice in Lawrence to embrace
this seemingly more gay-marriage-friendly argument, Justice O'Connor,
made clear her unwillingness to take the doctrine that far. 2
Romer v. Evans,53 has, so far, not had much generative force in fight-
ing legal discrimination against gay people. That may be because of the
unprecedented nature of the law the Court confronted in Evans: a state con-
stitutional amendment that (1) targeted a single class of people-homosex-
uals-and (2) sweepingly denied them all civil rights protections in every
area of life, from employment to housing to education. Because the law was
so overly broad, the narrow justifications the state offered could not sustain
it, leaving only impermissible animus as a likely motivating force behind
45. Id. at 567.
46. Id. at 578.
47. E.g. Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Fan. Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (1 lth Cir. 2004).
48. 539 U.S. at 578.
49. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Cf Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (invalidating state antimiscegenation law).
51. Infra pt. II(C)3.
52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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the law.54 Evans was one of the few times in the Court's history when a law
failed the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, the rational basis test.
Unless the Court were to apply strict scrutiny to laws that fence out
gay couples from marriage, a step neither it nor any federal court has taken,
states will need to show only a rational basis for their marriage laws. This
test requires the state only to show that the law is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental end. That is ordinarily not a difficult task.55 Thus,
there is little reason to believe a court would strike down all state marriage
laws or DOMA on equal protection grounds, at least under the present state
of those doctrines. Certainly no court has yet done so.
3. The Exaggerated Fear of a Threat from the Courts
Aside from the merits of a constitutional claim for same-sex marriage,
it is unlikely for practical and historical reasons that the Court would im-
pose it on the nation in the near future. The Court rarely strays far or long
from a national consensus on any given issue.56 When it does, it risks its
own institutional standing and credibility. Lawrence is no exception to this
rule since sodomy laws existed only in a minority of states (13 of 50), were
rarely enforced, and were opposed by most Americans at the time the Court
struck them down.
By contrast, only one state has recognized same-sex marriages and
laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples enjoy broad popular support
in most states and nationwide. If the Court were to order the recognition of
same-sex marriages by the states and federal government, whether under
the FFCC or a substantive constitutional doctrine, the entire country would
be aroused against it. I cannot think of another time the Court has done that
in modern times, with the instructive and chastening exception of Roe v.
Wade.57 The stark fact remains that no federal court, at any level, has or-
dered the recognition of same-sex marriages or declared DOMA
unconstitutional.
It is possible that pro-gay-marriage litigants could find a federal dis-
trict court somewhere that would declare DOMA unconstitutional or hold a
state ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. Such a ruling would be of
no consequence, however, since it would be immediately reviewed by the
governing appellate court. It is also possible, though very unlikely for the
foreseeable future, that litigants could find a panel of an appellate court
somewhere that would declare DOMA unconstitutional or hold a state ban
54. Id. at 632.
55. But see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (striking down exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage under rational basis review).
56. Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court 78-80 (Unwin Hyman
1989); see Mae Kuykendall, The President, Gay Marriage, and the Constitution, 13 Widener L.J.
799 (2004).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. Such a ruling would also be of little
consequence, however, since it would be reviewed en banc and/or by the
Supreme Court. As noted above, given the present state of the relevant
constitutional doctrines and the usual reluctance of the Supreme Court to
oppose a large national consensus on an important social issue, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the Court would allow such an appellate court ruling
to stand. The likelihood is that the Supreme Court would use one of a num-
ber of the procedural techniques available to it to dismiss the claim, without
even reaching the merits of the issue.58
In short, the fear of court-imposed, nationwide gay marriage is exag-
gerated and hypothetical. To amend the Constitution now to prevent it
would be to do so based on fear of a future, hypothetical adverse decision.
Proponents of the FMA are asking the nation to amend the Constitution
preemptively, something we have never before done.
The Constitution is the nation's founding blueprint. We should not tri-
fle with it. There have been more than 11,000 proposed constitutional
amendments, all supported by advocates who no doubt sincerely believed
that their causes required immediate constitutional support in order to save
the Republic. Yet leaving out the extraordinary founding period that pro-
duced the ten amendments known as the Bill of Rights and the extraordi-
nary post-Civil War period that produced three amendments, we have
amended it only fourteen times in more than two centuries. In contrast to
the present move to amend the Constitution in anticipation of possible ad-
verse court rulings sometime in the future, the framers believed the amend-
ment process should be reserved "for certain great and extraordinary
occasions."5 9
The Constitution should not be tampered with to deal with hypotheti-
cal questions as if it were part of a national law school classroom. It should
be altered only to deal with some clear and present problem that cannot be
addressed in any other way. We are nowhere near that point on the subject
of same-sex marriage. The "problem" of nationwide same-sex marriage is
neither clear nor present. At the very least, we should wait until an issue
calling for a national solution actually arises before we address it by chang-
ing the Constitution.
58. An example of this technical maneuver to avoid consideration of a thorny cultural issue is
the Supreme Court's recent decision to reject a non-custodial, atheist father's claim that it is
unconstitutional for public schools to lead children in reciting the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (dismissing
claim on the ground that the father lacked standing). Justice Stevens's majority opinion declared:
'The command to guard zealously and exercise rarely our power to make constitutional pro-
nouncements requires strictest adherence when matters of great national significance are at
stake." Id. at 2308 (emphasis added). This last sentence seems tailor-made for a future case in-
volving a gay-marriage claim.
59. The Federalist No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966).
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III. A FEDERAL AMENDMENT INTRUDES ON FEDERALISM
A constitutional amendment would be a radical intrusion on federal-
ism. From the founding of the nation, the design of our federal system has
been that the federal government has limited and enumerated powers and
that state governments have residual powers. The states have been free to
legislate on all matters not reserved for federal authority (such as regulating
interstate commerce or waging war). State power has been limited only in-
sofar as necessary to protect nationhood, the national economy, and individ-
ual rights. The basic constitutional design was best explained by James
Madison, who wrote in Federalist No. 45 that:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in
the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former
will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce .... The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordi-
nary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people, and in the internal order, improvement and prosper-
ity of the State.
60
The nation's commitment to federalism is enshrined in the Constitu-
tion's enumeration of specific congressional powers in Article I and in the
reservation of all other powers to the states in the Tenth Amendment. Spe-
cifically, states have traditionally controlled the content of family law, in-
cluding the definition of marriage, in their own jurisdictions. Within very
broad limits, there has never been a national definition of marriage imposed
by Congress or federal courts.
Concern over preserving the traditional authority of the states has been
a central theme of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence. In its recent
Commerce Clause cases, the Court has emphasized the need for limits on
federal power in the interest of preserving states' domain over areas like
criminal law and family law.61 These recent decisions upholding the role of
the states have been supported by the Court's most conservative justices,
like Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia.
Federalism is not valuable simply as an abstract tradition. It has a
couple of important practical benefits relevant here. First, it allows innova-
tion in public policy. Second, it maximizes individual choice and liberty by
allowing citizens to live in states that most closely suit their preferences.
Let's examine each of these in more detail.
First, federalism has served the country well insofar as it has allowed
the states to experiment with public policies, to determine whether these
60. The Federalist No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966).
61. See e.g. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-64 (1995).
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policies work or need to be amended, and then to follow or to decline to
follow the example of other states. Acting as laboratories of social change,
the states have been responsible for some of the most important innovations
in American law. These innovations have included allowing women to vote,
setting maximum hours for working, adopting minimum wage require-
ments, and prohibiting child labor.
Repudiating this long history, the FMA-both the Musgrave version
and the Allard version-would impose on the states a single, nationwide
definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman. It would
prohibit state courts or even state legislatures from authorizing same-sex
marriages. The supporters of the FMA freely acknowledge this much. But
additionally, it would tell states how to interpret their own state constitu-
tions and state statutes by prohibiting them from "construing" their own
laws so as to permit same-sex marriages or to grant marriage-like benefits
to same-sex couples. Although state legislatures might be free to adopt
"marriage-lite" institutions like domestic partnerships or civil unions that
accord some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, these laws
might be practically unenforceable in state courts. State courts, asked to
referee a dispute between the couple and the state over whether they quali-
fied for benefits under a domestic-partnership law, would be prohibited by
the Musgrave version of the FMA from "construing" the law to grant "the
legal incidents" of marriage to the couple.62 Purporting to "protect" the
states from gay marriage, the FMA tramples federalism.
Yet federalism is working on this subject. All over the nation cities and
states are debating whether to grant some form of legal recognition to same-
sex couples. States and localities are trying a variety of approaches, from
complete non-recognition to recognizing domestic partnerships that grant
some benefits to recognizing civil unions that grant all of the benefits of
marriage to marriage itself.6 3 California, for example, has legislatively rec-
ognized domestic partnerships that include almost all of the benefits and
protections of marriage.' These experiments test whether encouraging sta-
ble same-sex unions through some formal legal recognition and support is,
on balance, a good or bad thing. Under federalism, states have the opportu-
nity to see whether such recognition truly has the ill effects predicted by
opponents.
Second, federalism maximizes individual choice and liberty. By al-
lowing states to make divergent policy choices, we leave open the possibil-
62. For concerns that even the Allard version of the FMA might undermine legislatively
created marriage-lite proposals, see pt. V.
63. See e.g. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.
64. The California Secretary of State provides information and registration materials on its
website, Cal. Sec. of St., Domestic Partner Registry, http://www.ss.ca.govldpregistry/ (accessed
Mar. 4, 2005). The domestic partnership program is also available to opposite-sex couples where
one partner is 62 years or older.
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ity that citizens can move to states where public policy best reflects their
preferences and values. A citizen who highly values low taxes may choose
to live in Mississippi, which invests relatively little in public education. But
a citizen who highly values a strong system of public education may choose
to live in Minnesota, a high-tax state that spends proportionately much
more than Mississippi on education. A citizen of Massachusetts who
strongly opposes gay marriage can also move to Mississippi, for example,
where a large proportion of the population shares the anti-gay marriage per-
spective.65 A proponent of gay marriage living in Mississippi can move to a
state with a more hospitable public policy environment, like California or
Massachusetts. A nationally imposed definition of marriage, by contrast,
forecloses this opt-out choice by erasing individual state differences.
Beyond this issue of choice, there is a related point to be made about
the role of federalism in maximizing liberty. A constitutional ban on gay
marriage decreases the liberty of some citizens who want to marry-same-
sex couples-and who would otherwise be able to marry in some states.
Yet at the same time a constitutional ban does not increase the liberty of
anyone. The result of anti-federalism on the marriage issue is a net loss of
liberty. By contrast, allowing states to choose to recognize same-sex mar-
riages increases the liberty of citizens who want to enter such marriages
without decreasing the liberty of those who do not want to enter such mar-
riages. The result of federalism on the marriage issue is a net increase of
liberty. Individual liberty is not the only value in our national heritage, and
it can be outweighed by other considerations, but liberty is surely a very
important and traditional part of our constitutional and political order. An
approach that takes liberty from some without increasing it for others, as a
federal marriage amendment would do, starts the debate with a strike
against it.
It is true that there have been limited historical exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that states control their own family law, including the definition of
marriage. State power to define marriage is not plenary; there are a few
narrowly confined constitutional limits on this state power. The Supreme
Court decided in Loving v. Virginia,66 for example, that a state antimis-
cegenation law was unconstitutional. That decision was grounded in two
parts of the Fourteenth Amendment that explicitly restrain state power: the
fundamental right to marry protected by the Due Process Clause and the
anti-racist principles of the Equal Protection Clause. The decision altered
state law to uphold individual rights and to make the institution of marriage
more inclusive, not to derogate individual rights and to make marriage more
65. On November 2, 2004, Mississipians voted for a state constitutional amendment to ban
gay marriage by 86% to 14%, the largest margin yet in any popular vote on the issue. The
Associated Press, supra n. 24.
66. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
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exclusive. The decision was thus distinct in substance and spirit from the
FMA.67
There has been only one congressional limit placed on the ability of a
state to define marriage for itself. In the nineteenth century, Congress re-
quired Utah and a few other states to relinquish polygamy as a condition for
entering the union.68 Yet in so doing, Congress was exercising its existing
constitutional power to admit new states, not claiming some new federal
power over the states as the FMA would do. Further, Congress did not
attempt to limit existing states' ability to recognize plural marriages. It has
not, therefore, imposed a single definition of marriage on all states via the
Constitution. The fact that there is only one such very limited congressional
attempt to override a state's definition of marriage in more than 200 years
of our history suggests how deeply rooted respect for state power in this
area is. In short, there is simply no precedent for amending the Constitution
to intrude on states' structural constitutional power to determine their own
definition of marriage.
Federalism is not an inexorable command. First, Congress may set na-
tional policy on matters within its constitutional powers, even at the ex-
pense of states who dislike the national policy. Second, the federal
government, including all three of its branches, have a role in ensuring that
the states respect constitutional rights. But neither of these important excep-
tions to federalism applies to an amendment banning same-sex marriage.
Conservatives, including many who publicly oppose gay marriage as a
matter of public policy, have been especially troubled by the anti-federalism
consequences of a federal marriage amendment. Vice President Dick Che-
ney, publicly disagreeing with President Bush, has argued that states should
decide the issue of same-sex marriage for themselves.69 Many other promi-
nent American conservatives-including Bob Barr,7" Rep. Chris Cox (R-
Calif.)," and legal affairs writer Bruce Fein 72-oppose the FMA on feder-
67. The Supreme Court also acted to expand, but not to constrict, marriage in the states by
invalidating state laws that prohibited inmates from marrying, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97-
99 (1987), and denied marriage to parents in arrears on their child-support obligations, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-90 (1978). These cases, like Loving, are limited intrusions on state
marriage restrictions. By contrast, the FMA is expansive, imposing a single definition on all
states.
68. Pub. L. No. 61-219, § 20, 61 Stat. 557, 569 (1910) (Ariz. Enabling Act); Pub. L. No. 61-
219, § 2, 61 Stat. 557, 558 (1910) (N.M. Enabling Act); Pub. L. No. 59-234, § 3, 59 Stat. 267, 269
(1906) (Okla. Enabling Statute); Pub. L. No. 53-176, § 3, 53 Stat. 102, 108 (1894) (Utah Enabling
Act).
69. Lisa Stein, Cheney's Choice, U.S. News & World Report 14 (Sept. 6, 2004).
70. Barr, supra n. 42, at A23 ("Marriage is a quintessential state issue.... Make no mistake,
I do not support same-sex marriages. But I also am a firm believer that the Constitution is no place
for forcing social policies on states, especially in this case, where states must have the latitude to
do as their citizens see fit.").
71. Christopher Cox, The Marriage Amendment Is a Terrible Idea, Wall St. J. A22 (Sept. 28,
2004) ("For Republicans, who believe in federalism, the FMA is an uncomfortable fit. Restraint in
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alism grounds. Under federalism principles, this is not an area where federal
policy needs to intrude.
IV. A FEDERAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE UNUSUALLY
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC
A constitutional amendment would be peculiarly anti-democratic, the
first of its kind in the nation's history. At first, this claim is counterintuitive.
To be adopted using the usual procedure, an amendment would be "super-
democratic" in that it requires two-thirds approval of both houses of Con-
gress and approval from three-fourths of the states. 73 But even though an
amendment requires a supermajority in Congress and among the states, it
has three anti-democratic effects that should be considered. The first two
are common to all constitutional amendments; the third is peculiar to the
FMA. These anti-democratic effects provide even more reasons to be very
cautious in adopting constitutional amendments in general, and this one in
particular.
First, any amendment is anti-democratic as to the states that refuse to
ratify it. There could be as many as twelve states, perhaps among them our
most populous, like California and New York, that would be stripped of
their traditional power to decide the issue democratically by the actions of
the Congress and the thirty-eight ratifying states.
Second, an amendment would bind the people of all the states, even
those states that had approved the amendment, from ever reconsidering the
issue democratically (except through another federal constitutional amend-
ment). Under the present system, states may opt for one policy choice now
but are free to revise their own choice at a later date based on new knowl-
edge, arguments, and experience. The FMA would preclude that normal
democratic process, binding the people of the states forever to an earlier
decision made by an earlier generation lacking their experience.
Finally, the proposed FMA would be "peculiarly" anti-democratic, that
is, anti-democratic in a way that no other amendment has ever been. It
would mark the first time we will have amended the Constitution to limit
states' ability to decide democratically to expand rights and to include more
people in the fabric of national life. Up to now, the constitutional con-
straints on democratic processes have been designed to limit states' ability
to diminish rights and to exclude people from national life. Rather than set-
ting a constitutional floor on rights and inclusion, for the first time in our
history the FMA would set a constitutional ceiling on them."
the allocation of authority to the national government from the states is fundamental to our
Constitution.").
72. Bruce Fein, Constitutional Rashness, Wash. Times A14 (Sept. 2, 2003).
73. U.S. Const. art. V.
74. Perhaps the only exception to the rights-affirming constitutional amendment tradition
was the Prohibition amendment, ratified in 1919. U.S. Const. amend. XVIII. The nation soon
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The FMA would thus be a significant and, as I have argued, needless
departure from our legal history and traditions. A constitutional amendment
would have the effect of allowing the people of some states to order the
people of other states not to experiment with their own state family law.
The people of the states, traditionally free to act either through popular initi-
ative or through their own state legislatures, would lose their right to con-
sider the issue of same-sex marriage, or, as a practical matter, perhaps even
domestic partnerships or civil unions. Their family law would be frozen by
the will of people in other states or, alternatively, by the will of people in
their own state from an earlier generation. Further, domestic partnership
laws and civil unions in states and localities across the country might be
effectively repealed. Democratic outcomes would be reversed. Public de-
bate through normal democratic processes would be cut short. As conserva-
tive legal scholar Bruce Fein recently wrote in the Washington Times:
The amendment would enervate self-government . . . . Simple
majority rule fluctuating in accord with popular opinion is the
strong presumption of democracies. But that presumption and its
purposes would be defeated by the constitutional rigidity and fi-
nality of a no-same-sex-marriage amendment.75
Of course, in certain areas democratic experimentation should be lim-
ited, including by constitutional provisions if necessary. States should not
be free, for example, to experiment with racial segregation or with denying
women the right to vote. But these limitations on the democratic process
should be imposed, and historically have been imposed, only to vindicate
individual rights, not to deny individual rights. As discussed above, limita-
tions on democratic decisionmaking have heretofore been imposed only to
broaden the stake that individuals and groups have in our nation, not to
fence them out.
Moreover, although proponents of the FMA are no doubt sincere in
their defense of traditional marriage, the FMA may be largely a cynical
means by which to defend it. As the Senate leaders supporting an amend-
ment have acknowledged, popular opposition to gay marriage is gradually
waning." There was a "stronger societal consensus [against same-sex mar-
riage] at the time" Congress passed DOMA than there is today.7 7 If present
trends in popular opinion continue, that consensus will be even weaker in
the future. In general, time has not been on the side of those who oppose
equal civil rights for gays. The FMA appears to be an effort by opponents
regretted that exception and just fourteen years later it became the only amendment to be repealed.
Id. at amend. XXI, § 1.
75. Fein, supra n. 72, at A14.
76. Compare Senate Republican Policy Committee, supra n. 11, at 2, n. 7 (citing poll show-
ing opposition to same-sex marriage standing at 68 percent in 1996), with id. n. 5 (citing polls
showing opposition to same-sex marriage standing at between 53 percent and 62 percent in 2003).
77. Id. at 2.
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of same-sex marriage to set in constitutional cement their current advantage
in popular opinion before they lose that advantage. Though they claim pri-
marily to fear the courts, and not popular opinion, it appears to be the peo-
ple themselves they fear. The people simply cannot be trusted, on this view,
to adhere to the "right" position in the future. To the extent such tactical
considerations lie behind the drive to pass a marriage amendment, the
amendment reflects a deeply anti-democratic impulse, a fundamental dis-
trust of normal political processes.
V. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL AMENDMENT IS OVERLY BROAD
The FMA is constitutional overkill. If the fear prompting serious con-
sideration of the FMA is that a state court decision in favor of same-sex
marriage might be leveraged onto other states via Full Faith and Credit
Clause principles, the FMA is an overreaction. As discussed above, it
would do far more than prohibit such impositions via the FFCC. If the fear
is that courts will impose same-sex marriage on the country through the
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause, that fear is exaggerated
and hypothetical.
But even if I have been wrong about the likelihood of a court-led mar-
riage revolution, the FMA is not a carefully tailored response to that prob-
lem. A much narrower amendment, dealing only with courts' role in
deciding the particular question of same-sex marriage, could be proposed.
In my view, even such a narrower amendment would be unnecessary to
prevent the imposition of court-ordered nationwide same-sex marriage for
the foreseeable future. But at least it would not amount, as the FMA does,
to killing a gnat with a sledgehammer.
A few words should be devoted to the Allard version of the FMA
("revised amendment"), which has been promoted as a narrower amend-
ment allowing state legislatures to recognize civil unions and domestic part-
nerships. The revised amendment corrects none of the problems of the
Musgrave version upon which it is based. Like the Musgrave version, the
revised amendment is unnecessary; is an unprecedented intrusion on our
nation's historic commitment to federalism; is unlike any other constitu-
tional amendment in that it limits the ability of the democratic process to
expand individual rights; and is overly broad as a remedy for its propo-
nents' stated concerns about judicial activism. I laid out the arguments sup-
porting each of these points above and will not repeat them in detail here.
The revised amendment, like the Musgrave version, would forever
prohibit the democratic recognition of same-sex marriages. Since marriage
shall consist "only of the union of a man and a woman," no state legislature
will be free to authorize same-sex marriages. Similarly, the people of a state
will be prohibited from recognizing same-sex marriages through initiative.
Further, no state could amend its own constitution to provide for the recog-
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nition of same-sex marriages. Normal democratic politics would simply be
shut down on this issue.
The revised amendment, like the original Musgrave version, would re-
present an unprecedented intrusion on the historic power of the states to
define marriage. It would also intrude on the historic power of state courts
to interpret their own state constitutions. These powers have been basic
components of our system of federalism since the founding period. Nothing
in the revised amendment eliminates these affronts to federalism.
If the fear prompting the push for an amendment is that judges will
require states to recognize same-sex marriages, the revised amendment is an
overly broad response to that concern, just as the Musgrave version is. As
noted above, the proposed amendment would not only prevent judges from
ordering the recognition of same-sex marriages, it would also prevent legis-
latures and popular majorities from authorizing them. Again, the revised
amendment does not cure the overbreadth defect of the original proposal.
Sponsors of the revised amendment claim that it clarifies their inten-
tion to allow state legislatures to authorize "civil unions." That, however, is
still not clear in the revised amendment, which nowhere actually states that
intention. By striking the reference to "federal or state law," the second
sentence of the revised amendment seems to leave more room for the statu-
tory recognition of civil unions and domestic partnerships than did its paral-
lel in the original Musgrave version. But the new language by no means
solves the problem. This is so for two reasons.
First, the second sentence of the revised amendment provides that
neither the federal constitution nor any state constitution "shall be construed
to require that" the "legal incidents" of marriage be given to same-sex
couples. Under this language, any domestic partnership law or civil union
law that confers marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples may be effec-
tively immune from state and federal constitutional scrutiny. For example, a
civil union or domestic partnership statute might itself make invidious or
irrational distinctions among same-sex couples by giving some same-sex
couples more benefits than others or by shutting some same-sex couples out
of the statute altogether. Or a civil union statute or domestic partnership law
might impose procedural burdens on same-sex couples that violate due pro-
cess guarantees dealing, for example, with rights to notice and a fair hear-
ing. In the case of such a constitutional infirmity, the revised amendment
would prevent courts from correcting the problem by ordering that same-
sex couples be given any of "the legal incidents" of marriage. Under the
revised amendment, legislatively created civil unions or domestic partner-
ships might thus be effectively immune from state or federal constitutional
scrutiny seeking to remedy their unconstitutionality by conferring any addi-
tional benefits on same-sex couples or by including more same-sex couples
within the coverage of the statute. Under either version, the FMA would
effectively be an amendment to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
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and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.
Second, civil unions, which, like Vermont's law, grant to same-sex
couples all of the privileges and rights of marriage under a different name,
might still be prohibited altogether by the first sentence of the revised
amendment, which strictly limits marriage to opposite-sex couples. Once
the revised amendment is ratified, opponents of civil unions can be ex-
pected to argue that legislatures cannot circumvent the substance of the
amendment by giving same-sex couples everything marriage confers under
a different title. Consider an analogy. A state could not maintain its own
navy simply by the ruse of calling its fleet of ships an "armada" instead of a
"navy."7 8 A person could not be convicted of Treason on the testimony of
one witness, rather than the constitutionally required two witnesses,7 9 sim-
ply by calling the same offense "Schmeason." Even some drafters of the
FMA have argued that the first sentence of the proposed amendment pro-
hibits both marriage and civil unions identical to marriage.8 ° Since the first
sentence of the original proposed amendment and the first sentence of the
revised amendment are substantively identical, the analysis that it prohibits
both marriage and civil unions would still apply. If this analysis is right, the
revised amendment does nothing to preserve state legislative power to cre-
ate civil unions.
While it is not a foregone conclusion that the first sentence of the re-
vised amendment will prohibit the legislative enactment of civil unions,
there will certainly be a reasonable constitutional argument that it does. If
the purpose of the revised second sentence is to make it clear that legisla-
tures-but not courts or executives-may grant same-sex couples "the legal
incidents" of marriage, why not just say so directly rather than by negative
implication?
Moreover, this very uncertainty about the constitutionality of civil un-
ions will itself be used in state legislatures as an argument against creating
them to begin with. State legislators will be wary of acting in an unconstitu-
tional fashion and will be especially wary of creating a status full of entitle-
ments and responsibilities for same-sex couples only to have that status
stripped away in subsequent litigation. Thus, even if the revised amendment
is ultimately interpreted to allow the legislative creation of civil unions, it
will have delayed and deformed democratic debate on the issue.
The first sentence of the revised amendment suffers another problem
of the original proposal. Almost every other provision in our Constitution
contains a state-action requirement. (The only relevant exception is the
78. The Constitution forbids states to "keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace..."
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also Alan Cooperman, Little Consensus on Marriage Amend-
ment: Even Authors Disagree on the Meaning of Its Text, Wash. Post Al (Feb. 14, 2001).
79. U.S. Const., art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
80. Cooperman, supra n. 78.
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Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slavery.) Yet there is no state-action
element in the first sentence of either version of the FMA. For example,
there is nothing akin to: "Neither the United States nor any State shall rec-
ognize any marriage other than the union of one man and one woman." On
its face, the FMA appears to forbid both public and private recognition of
same-sex marriages. It could be interpreted to prohibit religious denomina-
tions from recognizing same-sex marriages, as some now do. More likely, it
could also be interpreted to prohibit private employers from making bene-
fits available on an equal basis to married employees and employees with
same-sex partners."1
The application of the FMA to private action is not an inevitable inter-
pretation. But the issue will have to be litigated and the uncertainty thus
created may delay or completely prevent the adoption of private-employer
domestic partnership policies.
Other difficult issues, like the definition of "the legal incidents" of
marriage will also generate considerable litigation. Up to now, these matters
have been left largely to the states. Now federal judges will be called upon
to decide them. It is ironic that an amendment designed to avoid judicial
activism in family law will invite much more of it. 2
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, a federal amendment banning same-sex marriage is not a re-
sponse to any problem we currently have. The solemn task of amending the
nation's fundamental law should be reserved for actual problems. Never
before in the history of the country have we amended the Constitution in
response to a threatened (or even actual) state court decision. Never before
have we amended the Constitution to preempt an anticipated federal court
ruling. Never before have we adopted a constitutional amendment to limit
the states' ability to control their own family law. Never before have we
dictated to states what their own state laws and state constitutions mean.
Never before have we amended the Constitution to restrict the ability of the
democratic process to expand individual rights. This is no time to start.
81. A significant portion of the Fortune 500 companies offer same-sex domestic partnership
benefits. Human Rights Campaign Found., Employers That Offer Domestic Partner Health Bene-
fits, http://www.hrc.org/; select Work Life, Domestic Partner Benefits, quick lists (accessed Mar.
4, 2005).
82. Rep. Chris Cox has observed that "the FMA would represent a choice by Congress to
vastly expand the reach of the federal courts." Cox, supra n. 71.
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